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Abstract 
Recent polls have suggested that between 20 and 25 percent of Americans erroneously 
indicate that President Obama is a Muslim. In this article, we test four models exploring explicit and 
implicit (i.e., automatic) associations that Americans have about the President and Islam. More 
specifically, we investigate how factors such as partisanship, ideology, candidate assessments, and 
political sophistication affect the likelihood of correctly identifying President Obama·V&KULVWLDQ
religious affiliation, as well as the probability of incorrectly indicating that he is likely a Muslim. We 
find that explicit associations between Obama and Islam are driven largely by political sophistication 
and candidate assessments, as well as implicit associations. Interestingly, while political 
sophistication does seem tohelp individuals make FRUUHFWVWDWHPHQWVDERXWWKH3UHVLGHQW·VUHOLJLRQ
knowledge does little toprotect them from holding faulty implicit associations. 
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Shortly before the 2010 midterm elections, several polls revealed that nearly 1 in 4 
Americans believed that President Obama is secretly a Muslim, and roughly half of the electorate 
questioned whether he is Christian.i Not surprisingly, partisanship and ideology seemed to influence 
these results³as many as 1 in 3 conservative Republicans iGHQWLILHG2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQDV,VODPii 
0DMRUPHGLDRXWOHWVRIIHUHGYDULRXVWKHRULHVWRH[SODLQWKHSXEOLF·VPLVSHUFHSWLRQVLQFOXGLng 
partisanship, ignorance, and a general disdain for Obama. Whatever the reason, inaccurate 
associations surely undermine more sanguine appraisals of the American electorate (Popkin 1991; 
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992) and favor ones that reflect information shortcomings and 
asymmetries (DelliCarpini and Keeter 1996). Moreover, there are likely electoral consequences of 
these associations, as they may threaten 2EDPD·Vlegitimacy as presidentandweaken his ability to 
promote a successful policy agenda.  
In this article, we address the following questions: First, do individuals truly associate Obama 
with Islam, or are they simply motivated reasoners who take the opportunity to express perceived 
negativity about the President? And second, how does political sophistication affect beliefs about 
Obama, given that it should both LQFUHDVHDQLQGLYLGXDO·VFDSDFLW\WRDFFXUDWHO\evaluate information, 
yet also increase exposure to misinformation? We test thesequestions by comparing LQGLYLGXDOV·
explicit responses on a survey about religion and politics with reaction time data from anImplicit 
Association Test (IAT), which measuresattitudes or beliefs that subjects may be unwilling or unable 
to explicitly reveal (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). 
0RWLYDWHG5HDVRQLQJDERXW2EDPD·V5HOLJLRQ 
Motivated reasoning (Ditto and Lopez 1992; Kunda 1990) offers one potential explanation 
for WKHPLVSHUFHSWLRQVDERXW2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQIRXQGLQUHFHQWSROOVHJVHH+ROODQGHU
When individuals engage in motivated reasoning, partisan goals trump accuracy goals; thus, 
individuals act as biased information processors who will vigorously defend their prior values, 
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identities, and attitudes at the expense of factual accuracy (Lodge and Taber 2000; Taber and Lodge 
2006; Westen et al. 2006). In the case of Obama,partisans on the right may be motivated to 
believerumors about the President and reject factual information that does not bolster theirparticular 
worldview. Evidence of this motivated believinghypothesis would come from convergent results for 
partisans on an explicit questionnaire and an IAT designed to reveal how strongly associated 
concepts are in memory. These associations are often referred to as ´implicitµassociations because 
they come to mind automatically (i.e., without conscious effort) and may be outside of an 
LQGLYLGXDO·Vawareness.iiiFor example, a person may unknowingly associate certain professions (e.g., 
doctors, lawyers, scientists, etc.) with males more than females because of gender stereotypes or 
participation rates; yet, when explicitly asked, this person would not necessarily say that these fields 
are linked to a particular gender. If motivated believing were occurring, conservativesshould be more 
likely than liberals to explicitly report that Obama is a Muslimbecause of their anti-Obama 
predispositions. Moreover, because these claims have already been accepted and stored into long-
term memory, conservatives should also be more likely than liberals to reveal 
implicitassociationsbetween Obama and Islam on an IAT. 
Motivated reasoning, however, can occur even if individuals do not actually believe 
information that suggests Obama is a Muslim. In other words, individuals may simply take the 
RSSRUWXQLW\WRH[SUHVVQHJDWLYLW\ZKHQDVNHGDERXWWKH3UHVLGHQW·VUHOLJLRQUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHLUDFWXDO
beliefs. Just consider the number of negative, yet simultaneously contradictory, names that Obama 
has been called by his detractors (e.g., labeling him a fascist and socialist in the same breath).iv And, 
let us not forget that until recently, liberal Democrats engaged in a similar practice of calling former 
President George W. Bush a litany of derogatory terms, many of which could not concurrently be 
true. Evidence for this phenomenon, which we call motivated expressing, would come from divergent 
patterns of explicit survey responses and implicit associations. According to this hypothesis, we 
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would still expect conservatives to explicitly state that Obama is a Muslim; however, because they 
construct this attitude on the spot and do not actually believe it to be true, conservatives would not 
exhibit stronger implicit associations than liberals between Obama and Islam on an IAT. While we 
cannot make any definitive conclusions about whether associations indicate beliefs, we build upon 
the notion thatassociations are a necessary condition for those who have beliefs.   
Political Sophistication and Exposure to Misinformation  
Another H[SODQDWLRQIRUWKHSXEOLF·VPLVSHUFHSWLRQVLVDZHOO-documented and widespread 
lack of political sophistication in the electorate (DelliCarpini and Keeter 1996), which should lead 
people to rely on other PHWKRGVIRUGHWHUPLQLQJ2EDPD·VUHOLJLRXVDIILOLDWion. For example, some 
individuals may use mental shortcuts, or heuristics (Popkin 1991), to surmise that the name Barrack 
Hussein Obama must have some Islamic roots. Others may have heard statementsDERXW2EDPD·V
Kenyan father or upbringing in Indonesia and assume that he is a Muslim because of these 
experiences. Whatever the exact process (which is beyond the scope of the present research), we 
assume that, in general, political sophisticates should be more capable of evaluating information 
(Luskin 1990) about Obama than their low-information counterparts. Consequently, sophisticates 
should be more likely to correctly identity Obama as a Christian than unsophisticated citizens. We 
call this the sophisticated processinghypothesis. 
Yet, we also know that politically sophisticated citizens are, by definition, more likely to be 
exposed to political information than unsophisticatedindividuals (DelliCarpini and Keeter 1992; 
Zaller 1992). As a result, sophisticates will likely endure repeated exposure to misinformation linking 
Obama to Islam. One poll taken just before the 2008 Presidential Election reported that as many as 
92% of Americans had heard at least one factually inaccuratestatement about Obama,v and one can 
only imagine how many times sophisticates may have heard or read misleading information about 
the President, given their greater political attention. So widespread were these rumors that the 
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2EDPDFDPSDLJQHYHQFUHDWHGDZHEVLWHFDOOHG´)LJKWWKH6PHDUVµWRUHIXWHIDOVHFODLPV circulating 
the Internet. Given that cognitive psychologists believe memory is organized associatively (Collins 
and Loftus 1975)³that is, in node-OLQNVWUXFWXUHVLQZKLFKFRQWH[WXDOWULJJHUVFDQDIIHFWDQRGH·V
accessibility³we expect repeated exposure to information, no matter how questionable, will create 
implicit associations between Obama and Islam. In other words, sophisticates need not believe 
specific misinformation to exhibit implicit associations in memory. Evidence for this hypothesis, 
which we call differential exposure, wouldcome from stronger implicit associations linking Obama to 
Islamamong sophisticates than non-sophisticates. 
In sum, we empirically test a number of different hypotheses concerning misperceptions 
DERXW3UHVLGHQW2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQ)LUVWRXUmotivated believing hypothesis suggests that partisans on 
the political right will be motivated to process negative misinformation about the President and 
commit it to long-term memory; thus, they should demonstrate stronger implicit associations (than 
those on the political left) between Obama and Islam. Second, our motivated expressing hypothesis 
suggests that conservatives will be more likely to explicitly state that Obama is a Muslim; however, 
because they do not necessarily believe it to be true, conservatives will demonstrate no differences 
compared to liberals on a task measuring implicit associations stored in memory. Third, our 
sophisticated processing hypothesis states that political sophisticates should be more capable of 
evaluating information about Obama than their low-information counterparts; hence, sophisticates 
ZLOOEHPRUHOLNHO\WRH[SOLFLWO\LGHQWLI\2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQFRUUHFWO\$QGILQDOO\ZLWKour differential 
exposurehypothesis we argue that because sophisticatesare more likelyexposed to information of all 
types³including repeated misinformation³they will exhibit stronger implicit associations linking 
Obama to Islam than politically unsophisticated citizens.  
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Experimental Design and Procedure 
One week after the 2010 midterm elections, 356 undergraduates enrolled at a southeastern, 
public university participated in our study. Of this total, 52 percent were female, and nearly 90 
SHUFHQWRIVXEMHFWVOLVWHGWKHLUUDFHDV´:KLWH&DXFDVLDQµ3DUWLVDQVKLSDQGLGHRORJ\ZHUHIDLUO\
evenly distributed, albeit slightly skewed toward Republicans and conservatives (41% Republican, 
30% Independent, and 29% Democrat; 38% conservative, 38% moderate, and 24% liberal). 
Although we make no claims about the representativeness of our sample relative to the American 
public, we do find the same proportion of individuals in our sample who state that President Obama 
is a Muslim (i.e., 1 in 5 participants) as reported in recent, nationally representative polls. Moreover, 
we suspect that any effects of partisanship, ideology, and political sophistication should be 
attenuated in anundergraduate sample; hence, our findings may actually be conservative estimates of 
the effects present in the general electorate. That is, older citizens tend to have more crystallized 
political attitudes and stronger partisan attachments than the typical college student(Sears 1986), and 
these experiences would likely exacerbate any observed effects linked to motivated reasoning. 
The first portion of the study involved a computer-based Implicit Association Test (IAT), 
which is designed to measure the strength of automatic associations between concepts in memory 
(Greenwald et al. 1998). Automatic associations³that is, SURFHVVHVWKDW´RSHUDWHRXWVLGHRI
FRQVFLRXVDZDUHQHVVDQGJXLGDQFHµ%DUJK	&KDUWUDQG³are important because they have 
been shown to disproportionately influence judgments and behaviors (Fazio 1995). The benefit of 
the IAT is that it allows us to detect implicit associations that may be unknown or intentionally 
misstated by individuals. Moreover, Devine (1989) and other scholarshave demonstrated that both 
motivation and ability are necessary to override the biases resulting from automatic associations.   
We presented subjects with words representing Christianity (Jesus, Christian, Gospel, and 
Church) and Islam (Muhammad, Muslim, Koran, and Mosque),vi as well as black-and-white images 
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of Barack Obama and John McCain,vii the major-party candidates from the 2008 Presidential 
Election,viii using a free, open-source program called FreeIAT (see Figure 1).ix Subjects were 
instructed to quickly sort each word or image into paired categories consisting of a candidate and 
religion, while making as few mistakes as possible. For example, in one block of trials subjects would 
be asked to sort objects into the category representing Barack Obama and Islam or John McCain 
and Christianity.x In total, subjects completed 5 blocks of timed trials.xi :HXVHGHDFKSDUWLFLSDQW·V
reaction times to calculate an IAT effect measure, which is commonly known as the D-score and is 
siPLODUWR&RKHQ·Vd (Cohen 1977) in that it may be interpreted as a measure of effect size 
(Greenwald, Nosek, and Sriram 2006). Positive D-scores (where -D LQGLFDWHDVVRFLDWLRQV
of Obama with Islam (and McCain with Christianity).xii 
Following the Presidents-Religion IAT, subjects completed a brief questionnaire that 
measured their explicit feelings toward various political figures, parties, and religions. We used the 
difference in feeling thermometer ratings of Obama and McCain to create a relative evaluation of 
the candidates (preference for Obama=1).xiii We also asked participants whether they could correctly 
LGHQWLI\2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQ&KULVWLDQ DVZHOODVWKHOLNHOLKRRGWKDW2EDPDLVa Muslim on a 4-
point scale (very likely=1). Finally, subjects completed an 8-item political sophistication test (high 
sophistication=1),xiv as well as demographic questions including gender (male=1), race 
(nonwhite=1), party identification (strong Republican=1; 5-point scale), and ideology (very 
conservative=1; 5-point scale).xv 
Results  
We begin by briefly reviewing some descriptive statistics from our survey and President·V- 
Religion IAT (see Table 1). First, only a slight majority of respondents (57%) were able to correctly 
identify Obama as a Christian, while a VL]HDEOHSRUWLRQRIWKHVDPSOHVWDWHGWKDWLWLV´YHU\ 
OLNHO\µRU´VRPHZKDW likelyµ that Obama is a Muslim. Moreover, we find that there is an overall IAT 
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effect, MD-score= 0.21, such that subjects automatically associated Obama with Islam. To put this in 
perspective, a mean D-VFRUHRIWUDQVODWHVWRD´PHGLXPµHIIHFWVL]HDFFRUGLQJWR&RKHQ·V
FODVVLILFDWLRQRI´VPDOOµ´PHGLXPµDQG´ODUJHµHIIHFWVXVHGIRU&RKHQ·Vd (Cohen 1988). It is also 
worth noting that the correlations among our implicit IAT effect measure and two explicit measures, 
FRUUHFWLGHQWLILFDWLRQRI2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQDQGWKHOLNHOLKRRGWKDW2EDPDLVD0XVOLPDUHPRGHVWDW
best, r = -0.26 and r = 0.30, respectively. Consistent with findings from a wide array of other IAT 
studies (e.g., see Lane, Banaji, Nosek, and Greenwald 2007), these relatively weak correlations 
among implicit-explicit measures suggest that our IAT taps a distinct dimension relative to the self-
reported questions about Obama. 
*** INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
Not surprisingly, Republicans, conservatives, and those with favorable feelings 
towardMcCainwere more likely to explicitly identify Obama as a Muslim (and less likely to identify 
him as a Christian) than Democrats, liberals, and those with favorable feelings towardObama. A 
similar pattern emerges when we examine implicit associations according to the D-scores and mean 
IAT reaction times reported in Table 1. Partisans on the political right had D-scores and mean 
reaction times between four and five times larger than those on the political left. We interpret these 
large differences to mean that pairings between Obama and Islam were consistent with existing 
associations for conservatives and thus facilitated their reaction times (relative to pairings of McCain 
and Islam). Finally, in the explicit questionnaire politicalsophisticates were more likely to 
correctlyidentify Obama·VUHOLJLRQthan less knowledgeable individuals; however, sophisticates show 
no difference in implicit associations compared to unsophisticated citizens. 
Now we turn to the results from our multivariate analyses, which allow us to test several 
different hypotheses (see Table 2). We regressed each of our three dependent variables³correctly 
LGHQWLI\LQJ2EDPD·VUeligion (logit model; column 1), the likelihood that Obama is Muslim (ordered 
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logit model; column 2), and our IAT effect D-score (OLS model; column 3)³on partisanship, 
ideology, political sophistication, gender, and race. The first two models test explicit associations, 
while the third model tests implicit ones. Recall that we proposed two competing motivated 
reasoning hypotheses to explain the consistent PLVLGHQWLILFDWLRQRI2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQ2QHSRVVLELOLW\
is that motivated believers, who are predisposed to accept and commit misinformation about 
Obama into long-term memory, should reveal strong associations on the PUHVLGHQW·V-Religion IAT, 
as well as biases on explicit survey items. Another plausible alternative is that motivated expressers 
would take the opportunity to state negativity about President Obama without actually believing the 
rumors; hence, we should find no IAT effect to accompany the biases on the explicit survey 
questions. 
*** INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
Looking at the effects of ideology on our explicit and implicit measures, we find strong 
support for our motivated believing hypothesis, which also means that we find little evidence of 
motivated expressing in the data. In each of our three models, ideology is correctly signed and a 
VWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWSUHGLFWRURIEHOLHIVDERXW2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQ)RULQVWDQFHWKHSUREDELOLW\WKDW
a strong liberal will correctly identify Obama as a Christian is 0.72, while the likelihood that a strong 
conservative will get this question correct is only 0.37 (holding all other variables at their mean 
values or reference categories). Likewise, the probability that a strong conservative will state Obama 
LV´YHU\OLNHO\µRU´VRPHZKDWOLNHO\µD0XVOLPLVFRPSDUHGWRRQO\IRUVWURQJOLEHUDOs. 
More importantly, the IAT effect,which measures associations between Obama and Islam, increases 
by 0.27 when moving from very liberal to very conservative on the scale. Substantively speaking, this 
means thatliberals demonstrate a weak association between Obama and Islam (i.e., a small effect size 
of 0.07), while conservatives exhibit a substantially strong association (i.e., a large effect size of 0.34). 
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Interestingly, the effects of partisanship are attenuated after accounting for ideology. Party 
identification only reaches conventional levels of statistical significance for one of the explicit 
dependent variables, where the probability that a strong Republican will identify Obama as a Muslim 
is 0.55 compared to 0.23 for a strong Democrat. In addition, partisanship is a marginally significant 
predictor (pRIDQLQGLYLGXDO·VD-score, such that moving from a strong Democrat to a strong 
Republican increases the IAT effect by 0.18, controlling for other factors. As noted, the weaker 
effects of partisanship in our models are largely attributed to the high correlation with ideology (r = 
0.75), which seems to be a stronger predictor of motivated believing than party identification. 
Next, we test our sophisticated processingand differential exposure hypotheses. We expected 
that political sophisticates should be more capable of evaluating the veracity of information about 
Obama and thus more likely to correctly identify his religion than their low-information 
counterparts. We also hypothesized that because sophisticates are exposed to more political 
information than unsophisticated individuals, and by extension, more misinformation, sophisticates 
should demonstrate stronger associations linking Obama to Islam on the Presidents-Religion IAT. 
Looking at Table 2, we see that political sophistication significantly predicts both of our 
explicit dependent variables.xvi We interpret these results as strong evidence for our sophisticated 
processing hypothesis, such that an increase in political sophistication reduces the likelihood that 
respondents explicitly PLVLGHQWLI\2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQ6XEVWDQWLYHO\WKHSUREDELOLW\WKDWDSROLWLFDOO\
VRSKLVWLFDWHGLQGLYLGXDOZLOOFRUUHFWO\LGHQWLI\2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQLVIRUXQVRSKLVWLFDWHG
respondents that probability is only 0.25. Moreover, the probability that someone who scores high 
on our measure of political sophistication will perceive Obama as a Muslim is only 0.20, while it is 
0.69 for those scoring low. 
Contrary to our differential exposure hypothesis, political sophistication has virtually no 
effect (b =0.01, s.e.=0.06, p> 0.90) on our implicit D-score. This means that although political 
 10 
 
sophisticates are able to explicitly FRUUHFWO\LGHQWLI\WKH3UHVLGHQW·VUHOLJLRQWKH\DUHQHLWKHUPRUH
nor less likely than unsophisticated individuals to automatically associate Obama with Islam. One 
way to interpret these null results is that political sophistication does not appear to inoculate citizens 
from the constant barrage of rumors, as those at high and low levels of sophistication exhibit the 
same 0.21 D-score linking Obama to Islam. This finding is also interesting because it suggests that 
even minimal exposure to misinformationfor unsophisticated individuals appears to create long-term 
associations in memory.  It also means that, at least for subjects in our sample, the investment of 
political learning did little to overcome implicit associations, as even knowledgeable, sophisticated 
individuals linked Obama with Islam. 
Modeling Simultaneous Relationships between Obama and Islam 
Single-equation, linear models do not accurately depict the complex relationships captured 
by our data, so we have also estimated a structural equation model (see Figure 2). The best fitting 
PRGHOƷ2(39) =58.49, p < .05, RMSEA=0.034, CFI=0.978, TLI=0.975, WRMR=0.972) indicates 
that exogenous factors like party identification, ideology, and race, do not directly influence beliefs 
aERXW2EDPD·VUHOLJLRQas we have previously modeled, but are instead mediated by feelings toward 
the President. These feelings, in turn, influence both implicit and explicit associations. Thus, we still 
find strong support for our motivated believing hypothesis, but we are now able to demonstrate that 
SUHGLVSRVLWLRQVDIIHFWDQLQGLYLGXDO·VHYDOXDWLRQRI2EDPDZKLFKLQWXUQVLJQLILFDQWO\LQIOXHQFHs the 
OLNHOLKRRGRIDFFHSWLQJPLVLQIRUPDWLRQDQGLQFRUUHFWO\LGHQWLI\LQJWKH3UHVLGHQW·VUHOLJLRQ,QIDFW
moving from those who strongly dislike Obama to those that strongly favor him decreases an 
LQGLYLGXDO·VD-score by a whopping 0.56 (recall that the effects of ideology and partisanship were 
0.27 and 0.18, respectively). 
*** INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
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In addition to the process that mediates motivated believing, our structural equation model 
allows us to explore the consequences of automatic associations on self-UHSRUWVDERXW2EDPD·V
religion. Consistent with research that demonstrates automatic associations influence judgments and 
behavior (Fazio 1995), we find that our implicit measure linking Obama and Islam significantly 
predicts the likelihood of correctly identifying his religion (b =-0.79, s.e. =0.22, p< 0.01), as well as 
the likelihood of stating that he is a Muslim (b =0.57, s.e.=0.18, p< 0.01), both in the expected 
direction. That is, implicit associations, which are automatically activated and may be outside of an 
LQGLYLGXDO·VFRQVFLRXVDZDUHQHVVincrease the probability of (mis)LGHQWLI\LQJWKH3UHVLGHQW·VUHOLJLRQ 
In sum, we find strong support for our motivated believing and sophisticated processing 
hypotheses but little evidence of motivated expressing or differential exposure in the data. We also 
demonstrate how this process works structurally. Predispositions such as ideology, partisanship, and 
race affect how citizens feel about Obama. This evaluation, in turn, motivates individuals to believe 
misinformation about the President, which creates implicit associations between Obama and Islam 
in long-term memory. Finally, these implicit associations increase the likelihood of perceiving and 
explicitly stating that Obama is likely a Muslim. Interestingly, political sophistication mitigates 
explicit associations, but it has no effect on implicit ones. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The finding that explicit statements are driven by implicit associations appears to comport 
with scholarswho suggest that voters utilizelow-effort devices such as heuristics to form their 
candidate assessments (Popkin 1991). But our assessment is far from optimistic.  In this 
case,judgments about Obama were significantly influenced by automaticassociations between the 
President and Islam. For partisans on the political right, who are generallyunmotivated to support 
Obama, these influences are likely inconsequential. However, for the rest of the electorate, these 
implicit associations³based upon misinformation³may bias subsequent judgments about the 
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President in a direction contrary to their own predispositions or motivations. These biases have the 
potential to undermine the legitimacy of the President and possibly damagesupport for his policy 
agenda on contentious issues such as healthcare or immigration.  
Importantly, research demonstrates that a person must be motivated and able to override 
implicit associations (Devine 1989).While our findings suggest that sophisticated individuals are 
capable of overriding these associations when making explicit statements, our results also reveal that 
sophisticates still have implicit associations linking President Obama to Islam.  What we do not 
know, however, is how the sources of information and frequency of exposure affect associations 
created from misinformation, as well as the ability to override them.   
/LQNLQJ2EDPDWR,VODPLVSDUWLFXODUO\SHUQLFLRXVLQWRGD\·VSROLWLFDOFOLPDWH, given how 
negatively the media have portrayed Muslims since the September 11th attacks(Jackson 2010). For 
instance, recent Gallup polls reveal that 40 percent of Americans admit to feeling some degree of 
prejudice toward Muslims.xviiIf economic indicators are mixed on Election Day, associations linking 
Obama with Islam could potentially swing key votes of moderates, independents, and the undecided. 
Our findings suggest that although routinely condemned, smear campaigns may be quite effective at 
creating false associations about political candidates. And, it may mean that simply stating something 
over and over again, regardless of its validity, has an impact on electoral outcomes.
                                                     
i For instance, see polls conducted by the Pew Research Center (07/21 ² 8/5/2010), Time magazine 
(8/16 ² 8/17/2010), and Newsweek (8/25 ² 8/26/2010). 
ii Pew Research Center Report dated 07/21 ² 8/5/2010. Retrieved from: 
http://pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Growing-Number-of-Americans-Say-Obama-is-a-
Muslim.aspx#1 
iiiFor further discussion of implicit associations, see Greenwald and Banaji (1995). 
iv 1HZVZHHNDUWLFOH´7KH,OOXVWUDWHG0DQµE\-RQDWKDQ$OWHUGDWHG$XJXVW 
v Scripps poll: 94 percent have heard way-out Obama, McCain rumors. ScrippsNews. Retrieved 
from http://www.scrippsnews.com/node/37045 
vi These category words were taken directly from the Religion IAT hosted at the Project Implicit 
website: <https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/>. 
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vii Four images of each candidate were carefully selected sRWKDWWKHFDQGLGDWHV·SRVHVIDFLDO
expressions, and attire were nearly identical. 
viii Recent evidence suggests that people elicit strong associations between factors such as Christian-
ness and American-ness and candidate assessments for Barack Obama and John McCain (Sheets, 
Domke, and Greenwald 2011). 
ix The FreeIAT software can downloaded from 
<http://www4.ncsu.edu/~awmeade/FreeIAT/FreeIAT.htm>. The Presidents-Religion IAT used 
in this study is available upon request from the authors. 
x The pairings of categories, as well as their assignment to specific keys, were randomly assigned and 
varied on successive trials 
xi Blocks 1, 2 and 4 each contained 20 practice trials to help subjects acclimate themselves to the 
sorting task. Blocks 3 and 5 consisted of 60 recorded trials that were used to compute Greenwald, 
1RVHNDQG%DQDML·V,$7D-score (M = 0.21, SD = 0.32; range -0.66 to 1.24), which is the 
preferred scoring algorithm for IAT studies. 
xii Details about the scoring algorithm used to compute the IAT effect (D-score) can be found at 
http://www4.ncsu.edu/~awmeade/FreeIAT/HowItWorks.htm, as well as Greenwald, Nosek, and 
Banaji (2003). 
xiii For ease of interpretation, all independent variables were recoded from 0 to 1. 
xiv We selected questions that were unrelated to President Obama and his religious views to avoid 
potential endogeneity issues. The political sophistication scale (M = 0.57, SD = 0.26; KR20 = 0.70) 
consisted of correct responses to the following items (correct answers and proportions in 
parentheses): 1) Responsibility to determine constitutionality of laws (Supreme Court; 74%); 2) 
+DUU\5HLG·VMRE6HQDWH0DMRULW\/HDGHUPDMRULW\QHHGHGWRRYHUULGHSUHVLGHQWLDOYHWR
(2/3; 64%); 4) more conservative party at national level (Republican Party; 92%); 5) current number 
of Supreme Court jXVWLFHV+LOODU\&OLQWRQ·VMRE6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH
Constitutional authority to declare war (Legislative branch; 51%); and 8) name of current Supreme 
Court Chief Justice (John Roberts; 34%). 
xv A full description of the variable codings and experimental protocol is available from the authors. 
xvi We also examined the interactions of political sophistication and a) partisan identification and b) 
ideology. None of these interactions were statistically significant. 
xviiSee Gallup poll conducted between October 31 ² November 13, 2009. Retrieved from: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/125312/religious-prejudice-stronger-against-muslims.aspx. 
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Figure 1. Screenshots from the Presidents-Religion Implicit Association Test (IAT)  
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Figure 2. Structural Equation Model of Relationship between Explicit and Implicit Measures 
 
Notes: N = 339. Weighted-least squares estimates (WLSMV) using delta parameterization and 1,000 iterations in Mplus (v. 4.1). Fit 
LQGLFHVIRUWKLVPRGHOȤ2(39) = 58.49, p < .05, RMSEA = 0.034, CFI = 0.978, TLI = 0.975, WRMR = 0.972. All paths are significant 
at the p < .05 level, except when indicated by a dotted line. Observed variables are shown with rectangles, while the latent variable is 
indicated with an oval. 
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Table 1. Explicit and Implicit Associations between Obama and Islam (by Key Characteristics) 
 
  
 Explicit Measures: 
2EDPD·V5HOLJLRQ 
Implicit Measures: 
IAT Effect & Reaction Time (RT) 
 Correctly 
Identified 
Likely 
Muslim 
IAT Effect 
(D-score) 
ƅ57PV2EDPDZ 
Christian ² Muslim 
Total     
All Subjects (n=356) 57% 41% 0.21 (0.32) 115.1 (191.5) 
Party     
Democrat (n=103) 69% 28% 0.09 (0.30) 38.7 (174.6) 
Independent (n=104) 59% 36% 0.18 (0.35) 108.7 (218.7) 
Republican (n=142) 46% 54% 0.32 (0.27) 174.9 (164.0) 
Ideology     
Liberal (n=83) 76% 23% 0.07 (0.28) 37.5 (144.9) 
Moderate (n=134) 54% 41% 0.20 (0.33) 104.2 (216.9) 
Conservative (n=136) 48% 52% 0.32 (0.29) 175.2 (171.7) 
Feelings toward Candidates    
Favor Obama (n=157) 70% 26% 0.08 (0.30) 46.7 (197.7) 
Favor McCain (n=148) 47% 56% 0.35 (0.29) 191.8 (168.1) 
Political Sophistication     
High (n=126) 72% 27% 0.22 (0.31) 112.8 (199.6) 
Medium (n=110) 56% 38% 0.20 (0.34) 111.1 (185.3) 
Low (n=120) 41% 58% 0.21 (0.31) 112.3 (189.8) 
Race     
Non-White (n=34) 62% 42% 0.14 (0.33) 81.6 (230.4) 
White (n=317) 56% 41% 0.22 (0.32) 118.8 (187.5) 
Gender     
Male (n=171) 62% 39% 0.22 (0.32) 121.3 (204.5) 
Female (n=182) 52% 43% 0.21 (0.32) 110.8 (179.6) 
,GHQWLILHG2EDPD·V5HOLJLRQ   
Correct (n=202) - - - - - - 0.14 (0.32) 72.4 (193.3) 
Incorrect (n=153) - - - - - - 0.31 (0.29) 172.7 (174.2) 
Likelihood Obama is Muslim    
Unlikely (n=209) - - - - - - 0.15 (0.32) 79.0 (186.4) 
Likely (n=145) - - - - - - 0.30 (0.30) 168.1 (188.2) 
     
Notes: Cell sizes do not always total 356 due to missing values. The IAT Effect (D-score) is the difference in corrected 
mean response times between stereotype-inconsistent and consistent trial blocks (i.e., pairing Obama-Christianity and 
McCain-Islam;Obama-Islam and McCain-Christianity, respectively) divided by the pooled standard deviation. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Models of Explicit and Implicit Associations between Obama and Islam 
Notes: The IAT Effect (D-score) is a measure of association, where -D DQGSRVLWLYHVFRUHVLQGLFDWHDQ
association between Obama with Islam (and McCain with Christianity). Models are estimated using logit, ordered-logit, 
and OLS respectively.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01 
 
 Explicit DV:  Explicit DV: Implicit DV: 
 Religion Correctly 
Identified 
Likelihood Obama 
is Muslim 
IAT Effect 
(D-score) 
    
Party Identification -0.32 1.42* 0.18 
 (0.69) (0.67) (0.10) 
    
Ideology -1.50* 1.84* 0.27* 
 (0.76) (0.74) (0.11) 
    
Political Sophistication 2.24** -2.17** 0.01 
 (0.47) (0.38) (0.06) 
    
Male 0.30 -0.07 -0.01 
 (0.24) (0.21) (0.03) 
    
Non-White 0.15 -0.11 -0.02 
 (0.43) (0.40) (0.06) 
    
Intercept -0.14 - - - -0.03 
 (0.42)  (0.06) 
    
&XWSRLQWƴ1) - - - -0.60 - - - 
  (0.39)  
    
&XWSRLQWƴ2) - - - 0.96 - - - 
  (0.40)  
    
&XWSRLQWƴ3) - - - 2.91 - - - 
  (0.42)  
    
(Pseudo) R2 0.09 0.09 0.10 
    
N 346 344 345 
    
